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I. Introduction
For many decades research in economics has explored how a decentralized economic
system performs relative to a social optimum. By and large, there is consensus, that
competitive markets perform well, when the commodities are given and when the price
system can communicate and coordinate all relevant information. (e.g. Hildenbrand,
1982). The basic tenet of information economics posits that under informational
asymmetries, non-market institutions typically tend to Pareto-dominate market
mechanisms. So how do decentralized systems perform, when the commodity space
itself is endogenous, or when some of the commodities need to be invented first, before
they can be traded? In this case both of these two conditions stated for the beneficial
working of a market system are violated: the product space is not fixed and the
information about future innovations is highly asymmetric between inventors, possible
financiers and potential ultimate users. Will decentralized systems still work
satisfactorily under such conditions? How do decentralized, and hence competitive,
markets perform as “discovery procedures” (v. Hayek (1969))?
The answer to this question might have far-reaching implications. If v. Hayek
was right, why do we then, for example, observe such a strong political pressure for
interventionist policies in Europe (Lisbon strategy) or Asia?1
In their studies of the architecture of economic systems Sah and Stiglitz (1986,
1988) argue that decentralized market-based systems tend to generate more innovations
than bureaucratic and centralized economics systems. And, indeed, innovative activity
thrives under conditions of decentralized financing as can be witnessed in countries with
active venture capital markets. As Sah and Stiglitz have pointed out, when information is
incomplete and individual assessments are imperfect, decentralized decision procedures
will give greater chances for truly good projects to be eventually identified and therefore
implemented. On the other hand, in decentralized markets truly bad projects also benefit
from additional chances for financing. Hence, quite generally a decentralized market
system tends to provide financing to more projects – both good and bad ones.  However,
in the models of Sah and Stiglitz information is exogenously fixed. To the extent that
rejected applications return to the pool of unscreened entrepreneurs, the information
1 For more detailed discussions of related issues we refer to, for example Bolton and Farrell (1990).
2about a previous negative screen is socially lost, and the pool of applicants becomes
adversely selected. Obviously, this screening externality will affect the incentives of
other financiers to produce information. This poses the following question: Can a
market-based system induce socially optimal production and aggregation of information
at all?2
While Broecker (1990) was the first to analyze the impact of the negative
screening externality on competition, we analyze the impact of this screening externality
on information production in a decentralized market. In particular we explore the
dynamic properties of decentralized screening in competitive financial markets. How do
markets perform from a societal perspective? Should the costs of acquiring information
on projects seeking funding be subsidized, or should they be taxed? How can potential
market failures in the market for project screening be recognized by outside observers?
Answers to these questions figure high on the European policy agenda, since
inefficiencies in venture financing are widely made responsible for the lackluster growth
performance of the European Union in a global perspective.
We provide a simple dynamic model of competitive start-up financing. We
assume that screening requires resources, as is typical in the venture capital industry.
For our simple setting we can work out a complete characterization of the market
equilibrium configurations and how their qualitative nature depends on crucial
underlying parameters, in particular the screening costs, imperfections in the screening
technology and the potential project returns.
Compared to the first-best screening regime we find that excessive screening may
emerge as an equilibrium in a range of intermediate screening costs. Also, for
sufficiently low screening costs we find that the screening activities are typically not
socially optimal for a certain range of project returns. Interestingly, even when the pool
of new projects is stationary, we find parameter constellations with screening cycles such
that periods of screening are followed by periods of inactivity and vice versa. Screening
cycles are always evidence of inefficient information acquisition, and imperfections in
2 In the case of fixed information markets are superior to bureaucracies whenever the social cost of
(erroneously) denying truly good projects exceed the social cost of (erroneously) adopting truly bad
projects.
3the screening technology are necessary for their emergence. In our model cycles
typically result from excessive screening whenever they occur.
Decentralized screening generates cycles even in a stationary environment
because project-specific information produced in earlier rounds of screening is
proprietary information so that no social memory is created. Unworthy projects, which
are rejected by a given financier, may apply to some other financier in later rounds. By
so doing they tend to worsen the quality of the overall project pool as long as the
screening technology is informative. If in a given period the pool is sufficiently
adversely selected, all financiers may prefer to halt their screening activities and wait
until sufficiently many new projects have entered and improved the average pool quality
to render screening profitable again. So the inactivity is caused by the pool-worsening
effect of decentralized search by the project holders. From a social point of view this
inactivity implies that the funding, and thereby implementation, of creditworthy projects
is delayed. Moreover, screening cycles may interact with other sources of dynamic
instability, as will be briefly discussed in the concluding section.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section II presents our basic model with costly
screening. Section III characterizes market outcomes under competitive screening. In
section IV we compare the market outcome with the first best solution and provide a
short policy discussion. Section V summarizes and lays an agenda for future research.
II. A Model with Costly Screening
Consider the following simple dynamic setting with adverse selection with respect to
risky projects of unobservable types. A proportion l  of the projects is of creditworthy
(good) type, whereas the remaining proportion l-1  never generates any positive cash-
flow.3 Each project requires one unit of funding. A good project returns a cash flow of
GR  in case of success and nothing otherwise. The probability of success is [ ]1,0Îp .
While entrepreneurs develop project ideas they require outside funding. For
reasons of tractability we assume they have no funds of their own. Potential financiers
3 This is a convenient simplification. In fact we only need that expected returns do not cover the
opportunity costs of funding.
4such as banks or venture capitalists can invest their funds either in the capital market at
the risk free rate normalized to zero or in entrepreneurial projects with the return profile
characterized above. Financiers are risk neutral. Thus the ventures are potentially
attractive only when their expected return exceeds the opportunity cost of funding, i.e.
1>GRp , since entrepreneurs are assumed to be protected by limited liability.
The innovation activities are particularly risky for outside financiers because of
their very nature. Investors typically do not have the particular project- and industry-
specific knowledge, which is necessary to make informed funding decisions.  This is
why extensive, and hence costly, screening of innovative projects by experts and why
proper contractual design are crucial features for successful outside funding of such
ventures. We here, for simplicity, capture these aspects by assuming that the financiers
have access to a screening or testing technology that generates information about the
underlying project type. The test costs .0>c 4 Moreover and importantly, we assume
that this test is imperfect. While the test identifies good projects with certainty, it may
misclassify truly bad projects with a positive probability 0>b .5
The market operates dynamically over time without discounting. We consider a
stationary framework in discrete time where in each period a unit mass of new ventures
enters the pool of potential projects in need of funding. Those projects live for two
periods. Hence they can apply for funding in the first period immediately after entering
the pool, and, if rejected, again in the second period. Thereafter they are worthless and
decay.
It is worth emphasizing that at any point in time the pool of potential projects in
need of funding consists of new projects, a portion l of which are of good quality, plus a
mass of projects rejected by other financiers in the previous period. Given that screening
is informative, this pool tends to be more adversely selected than the pool of new
projects entering the market in each period. This negative screening externality has been
4  These costs are typically substantial. For example, Bengtsson et al. (2002) demonstrate that successful
applications in the venture capital industry typically require a screening period ranging from a couple of
weeks up to a few months. This is expert management time.
5  Again we could also allow misclassifications of good projects, and thus generalize our argument (e.g.
Gehrig and Stenbacka (2004)).
5identified first by Broecker (1990) in a static framework. In this paper we analyze the
dynamic implications of this screening externality in competitive markets.
Strategic decisions are as follows. In each period t, financiers announce lending
rates at which they are committed to fund a project if this has been classified as a good
project. In doing so, financiers need to take into account their screening activities in that
period. Alternatively, the financiers can also choose to grant funds without screening in
order to economize on screening costs. And finally the financiers can decide to remain
inactive altogether.
This completes the description of the basic model. We proceed to characterize
screening and financing decisions in a decentralized market in section III.  In section IV
we subsequently extend our analysis to the case of a coordinated allocation. This will
allow us to compare market outcomes with first best allocations.
III.  Funding Equilibrium in Decentralized Markets
In this section we present a complete characterization of the market equilibrium with an
emphasis of showing how its qualitative nature depends on crucial underlying
parameters, in particular the screening costs, imperfections in the screening technology
and the potential project returns. Our main interest is the analysis of the implications of
the screening externality in large decentralized markets. In such markets a previously
rejected entrepreneur has a second chance to apply for funding. We will assume that the
pool of financiers is of unit mass, which is equivalent to assuming no recall for the
financiers, since a given entrepreneur will almost surely never be re-matched with a
financier who previously rejected his project. Given that screening is imperfect and that
occasionally truly bad projects will receive funding, there is always a positive incentive
on behalf of the project holders to apply for funding, even when the underlying ventures
are truly bad.6
Given the overlapping generations structure of the projects, in each period there
are at most two vintages of projects bidding for funding, new and seasoned projects.
6  In our setup the benefits of a further application always exceeds the cost of such an application, which
we fix at zero. So each applicant – good or bad – will apply again. (Of course, good types will not have to
submit a second bid, since, by assumption, they are classified correctly.)
6Since the pool of seasoned projects has already been previously tested it is more
adversely selected than the pool of new incoming projects. Hence the screening activity
across periods may be state dependent, where the state consists of the screening activity
in the previous period.
We here consider only the discrete states of unscreened funding (A), of screened
funding (S) and of inactivity (N). The case of mixed strategies is briefly discussed later
in section V.
 After a period of unscreened funding, the project pool consists only of new
projects, since all seasoned projects have received financing and, consequently, have left
the pool of project applicants. Unscreened funding will occur as a stationary competitive
equilibrium, when two conditions are met: i) the repayment rate *tR of unscreened
lending recovers the ex-ante insolvency risk,
lp
1* ³tR , ,...2,1=t , and ii) the cost of
screening is sufficiently high so that it exceeds the associated reduction in the risk
premium of the competitive lending rate. In general, screening is valuable because it
reduces funding costs by eliminating bad projects. The proportion of unworthy projects
is l-1 , and, since the test is imperfect, only a portion of b-1  of those can be
eliminated by screening. Accordingly, screening is economically viable as long as
screening costs are sufficiently low, i.e. ( )( )bl --< 11c .
Proposition 3.1 (high cost of screening):
When ( )( )bl --³ 11c   there are dynamic competitive equilibria that either consist of
i) unscreened financing  in each period, when
lp
1
³GR , or
ii)  inactivity in each period, when
lp
1
<GR .
Proof: See Appendix.
At a lower cost of screening, however, a dynamic equilibrium with unscreened
funding in each period is no longer viable. In this case, screening has the potential to
7generate information, which is sufficiently valuable to cover the screening costs.
Competition ensures that those potential efficiency gains are exploited. But at the same
time uncoordinated screening generates a negative pool externality, because the rejected
projects get another chance to submit a bid. This interplay between the informational
value of screening and the pool externality generates three different dynamic patterns.
When the informational value is sufficiently large relative to the costs of screening, a
dynamic equilibrium consists of screening in each period. With a moderate informational
value, periods of screening are followed by a period of inactivity. Screening is not
profitable until the pool is sufficiently improved by the entry of new projects into the
pool of applicants. Under precisely this configuration screening cycles will occur. In our
simple framework these cycles turn into 2-cycles, i.e. cycles where screening and
inactivity alternate so as to generate cycles with a length of two periods.  When the
screening costs are sufficiently large relative to project repayments, lending will break
down in each period. These results are rigorously formulated in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.2 (moderate and low cost of screening):
When ( )( ) ( )( )bl
b
bl
--+
-
--£
111
211c  there are dynamic competitive equilibria that
either consists of
i) screening in each period with a lending rate
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
lp
bl
lp
bbll cRSS
--+
+
--+
=
11121 ,   when
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )cRG blbblllp --++--+³ 11121
1 or
ii) regular 2-cycles with screening and lending at rate ( )
lplp
bll cRNS +
-+
=
1
following each period of inactivity, when
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )cRc G blbblllpblllp --++--+££+-+ 11121
111
 and additionally ( )( )bl --£ 11c  ,
8or
iii)  inactivity in each period, when
( )( )( )
þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì +-+< cRG blllplp
11,1min
Proof: See Appendix.
Propositions 3.1. and 3.2 provide a full characterization of the competitive market
equilibria in our lending market.  Figure 1 provides an illustration in a ( )GRc, -diagram
for given parameter combinations of pl,  and b . Screening cycles occur in region A.
Figure 1: Characterization of market equilibrium: screening cycles occur in region A,
multiple equilibria in region B.
9Observe that the conditions on screening costs in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 define
overlapping regions for c. Moreover, it holds true that
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )bl
b
blbl
--+
-
--<--
111
21111 . Accordingly, in this parameter range,
denoted B in Figure 1, there are multiple equilibria for sufficiently high project returns.
We highlight this feature in the next corollary.
Corollary 3.3 (multiplicity of market equilibria)
In the range ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )bl
b
blbl
--+
-
--££--
111
21111 c  (region B in Figure 1)
there are market equilibria both with stationary screening in each period and with
stationary unconditional financing in each period, if project characteristics satisfy
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )cRG blbblllp --++--+³ 11121
1  .
Proof: Immediate from Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
Multiplicity of equilibria is a first manifestation of the pool worsening effect in a
dynamic context. Because of the pool worsening effect the returns of screening are
higher, if there has already been screening in the previous period. This is why the critical
screening cost threshold is higher if there has been screening in the previous period. In
this case screening will cut costs more efficiently than if there had been inactivity or
acceptance of all project applications in the earlier period. Hence screening is more
valuable subsequent to a period of screening, but, on the other hand, it then focuses on an
adversely affected pool.
It should also be emphasized that our model predicts screening cycles as an
equilibrium phenomenon, under the circumstances characterized in Proposition 3.2 (ii),
in an otherwise completely stationary environment. These cycles constitute another
manifestation of the pool worsening effect of uncoordinated screening. The pool
worsening externality induced by screening in a given period can deteriorate pool quality
in the subsequent period to such an extent that screened lending does not become
profitable again until the quality of the pool of applications has recovered sufficiently
through the entry of the new generation of projects in the next period. Screening-induced
10
lending cycles of this type will occur for the combination of sufficiently small screening
costs and moderate project returns. It should be emphasized that the presence of
classification errors is a necessary element behind the emergence of these screening
cycles. Namely, in a formal sense the region with parameter combinations leading to
screening cycles shrinks and disappears in the limit as the probability for a classification
error approaches zero.
Screening cycles occur under conditions where the pool of applicants is adversely
selected to a sufficient degree. These conditions are most likely met in the venture capital
industry. Bengtsson et al. (2002) provide evidence about substantial costs of screening
for a particular venture capital fund. They report that the acceptance rate in their sample
ranges from 2 to 5 percent, and that the screening process typically involves several
rounds of increasing screening intensity by highly qualified experts. Thus screening
typically involves significant delay in the order of several weeks and even months until
approval of a single successful project. It also comprises significant opportunity costs in
terms of expert salaries.
The emergence of screening cycles is very interesting in relationship to the
important literature on financial accelerator effects. Existing theories of financial
accelerator effects (summarized by, for example, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000))
emphasize mechanisms whereby adverse shocks to the economy are endogenously
amplified and propagated by credit market imperfections. In contrast to these theories
focusing on how asset price fluctuations are amplified and propagated by credit market
imperfections our theory does not require the existence of exogenous stochastic shocks.
Instead the cycles are generated based on a mechanism emphasizing the pool-worsening
effects associated with decentralized screening within the framework of a stationary
environment. Our model shares the ability to generate cycles in an otherwise stationary
environment with Suarez and Sussman (1997). However, the mechanism is completely
different because in Suarez and Sussman the credit cycles are essentially generated by
state contingent incentives for risk taking on behalf of project holders, whereas the
screening activities on behalf of financirs are the source of cycles in our model.
When the screening costs are sufficiently low relative to the potential cashflows,
screened finance prevails. Under such circumstances the screening externality manifests
itself as a higher risk premium incorporated in the lending rate.
11
Does the competitive credit market grant funding under those circumstances
when it is efficient and are the terms of lending efficient? What can be said about the
socially optimal amount of screening? Since Propositions 3.1 and 3.2. provide a full
characterization of the competitive equilibrium, we can conduct a complete welfare
analysis. This is the topic of the next section.
IV. Welfare Analysis
The welfare analysis is particularly simple in our framework. Due to the inelastic
demand of funding, the monopoly allocation is an allocation, which actually maximizes
total surplus. Hence, we can compare the equilibrium allocations with the monopoly
allocations.
In contrast to the decentralized market allocation, the monopolist does not suffer
from the screening externality. We assume that a monopoly financier has full recall of
earlier project applications. Hence formerly rejected applicants do not enjoy a second
chance. How will this implicit inter-temporal coordination affect screening and lending?
Clearly, with the market structure of a monopoly the financier can collect all
surplus based on the unchallenged market power. Hence pricing is straightforward. The
interesting issue, however, is to analyze the funding, and more precisely the screening,
decision of the financier in a monopoly position. As before, the monopolist may select
among three lending strategies: (i) inactivity (no lending and no screening), (ii) screening
and lending to projects classified as creditworthy and (iii) universal lending without
screening. The optimal behavior of the monopoly financier is characterized in
Proposition 4.1.
 Proposition 4.1:   (monopoly financier)
The monopoly financier chooses
i) unscreened finance (A)  if ( )( )bl --³ 11c   and
lp
1
³GR
ii) screened finance (S)  if ( )( )bl --< 11c   and ( )
lp
bll cRG
+-+
³
1
iii) inactivity (N) otherwise.
Whenever lending occurs the monopoly financier claims the full surplus, i.e. GRR =
*  .
12
Proof: See Appendix.
The results are straightforward. The monopoly grants unscreened finance, when
screening costs are sufficiently severe so as to outweigh the informational value of
screening. Of course, unscreened funding takes place only insofar as project quality is
sufficiently high so as to cover the ex-ante risk premium associated with the unscreened
project pool. For sufficiently low screening costs, it is optimal for the monopoly
financier to grant screened funding as long as the projects identified through screening
are creditworthy in the sense that they are associated with sufficiently high expected
returns. Only when screening plus lending costs cannot be covered, inactivity will result.
This happens for the combination with sufficiently high screening costs and sufficiently
low returns for a successful project.
When the characteristics of the entering pool of new project applications is
invariant over time, the monopoly financier’s behavior is, unsurprisingly, always
stationary. Hence, in an otherwise stationary environment cycles must necessarily be
interpreted as manifestations of inefficiencies. But which way does the inefficiency go?
Is there excessive screening or is there insufficient information production?
Figure 2 compares the regimes of Propositions 3.1, 3.2. and 4.1. From this we can
see that the social optimum differs from potential market outcomes in regions A and B.
Decentralized competition generates cycles for sufficiently low screening costs (area A)
for a certain range of project returns. As we can infer from Proposition 4.1 (ii) it would
be socially efficient to screen unconditionally in this case. In this parameter range, when
evaluated over the whole 2-period screening cycle the market produces the same amount
of information about creditworthy projects as a monopolist would do.7 However, the
decentralized market allocation generates delay in order to prevent the duplication of
information production about bad projects. Hence creditworthy projects will receive
7  It is straightforward to modify the basic model such that in this range the market provides strictly less
information about good projects relative to the first best. For example, if a sufficiently small portion e of
new projects already dies after the first period, by continuity the qualitative properties remain valid.
However, in this case some good projects will definitely not be financed in states of inactivity associated
with a cyclical market equilibrium.
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funding every second period only. In this respect, the competitive market outcome
induces a social cost associated with delayed information production even though all
projects are ultimately screened.
Figure 2: Welfare consequences: cycles in region A, exzessive screening in region B.
For sufficiently high screening costs we know from Corollary 3.3 that there are multiple
equilibria with some involving screening (region B). In light of Proposition 4.1 (i) the
equilibrium with unconditional financing as described in Proposition 3.1 is efficient
under those circumstances, whereas the equilibrium with constant screening (Proposition
3.2) is inefficient in this range. Here screening results from rent seeking in decentralized
markets. Since competitors screen each financier faces a pool of applicants which is
adversely selected to such an extent that unscreened financing is not viable in
equilibrium. In this respect the pool-worsening effect induced by competition is also in
this range the mechanism behind the inefficiency associated with the equilibrium with
constant screening. On the other hand, in a no-screening equilibrium the cost of
screening is not warranted by the pool characteristics as long as all competing financiers
(rationally) abstain from screening. Clearly, for this parameter configuration the
14
screening equilibrium is associated with too much information production compared
with the social optimum. In this range a ban on screening would achieve a Pareto-
superior outcome.
Only when screening costs are high enough such that screening is not viable as a
market outcome the market equilibrium is again efficient.
In summary, we have found that in our framework the market equilibrium never
induces insufficient information production. Nevertheless under many circumstances
(parameter configurations captured by regions A and B in Figure 2) the market
equilibrium is socially inefficient, and the nature of this inefficiency is highly contingent
on the magnitude of the screening costs. With sufficiently low screening costs the market
equilibrium is characterized by screening cycles. Under these circumstances the
competitive market outcome induces a social inefficiency associated with delayed
information production even though all projects are ultimately screened. For sufficiently
high screening costs there are multiple equilibria. Under such circumstances the
equilibrium characterized by repeated screening induces excess information production
compared with the social optimum. The pool-worsening effect of screening is essentially
the source of the market failure whenever the decentralized project evaluation induces
inefficiencies, no matter whether these take the form of delayed information production
as in the configuration with screening cycles or simply excess screening as in the case
with equilibrium with repeated screening for the range of intermediate screening costs.
V. Discussion
In this section we discuss the robustness of our analysis. In section i) we explore to what
extent the result about excessive information production is robust. Could it be possible
that markets provide too little information? In section ii) we analyze the implications of
allowing randomized screening and lending strategies.
i) Excessive Information Production
Our analysis of the cycling region in section IV reveals that good projects are always
screened, as long as screening takes place. However, there tends to be excessive
screening of bad projects relative to coordinated funding. Moreover, there is a parameter
15
region with multiple equilibria where in one of these equilibria screening does occur
even even though a monopolist financier would lend on good faith without screening. So
information production can be excessive in decentralized markets. Is this a general
feature of decentralized markets?
The answer is no. A slight modification of our model demonstrates that markets
may generate too little valuable information. For example, let us modify our model so
that a small portion 10 << e of each project cohort is viable for only one period.
Assume that this holds for good and bad projects alike.
This modification does not change the monopolist’s decision problem. The
optimal behavior of the monopoly financier is stationary anyway, so all good projects
will be funded, whenever it is socially efficient to do so.
But also the decision problems of competitive financiers remain unchanged as
long as the proportions of good and bad projects remain constant, which we assume.
Hence cycling will still occur in decentralized markets for the same parameter values as
established in the base model. However, in contrast to the base model, creditworthy
projects are now not only delayed, but they are denied altogether generating increased
welfare costs. A coordinated lending industry would provide funding even to those
projects.
Proposition 5.1 (inefficient cycles)
Screening cycles occur in competitive markets under the conditions of Proposition 3.2
(ii). In addition, when ( )
lp
bll cRG
+-+
>
1  the coordinated stationary screening
outcome strictly Pareto-dominates the uncoordinated outcome with screening cycles.
Consequently, whenever cycles occur, a small portion e  of projects entering in periods
of inactivity will leave the market unscreened.  From a social point of view this is good if
bad projects are eliminated that way. But on the other hand also the potential surplus of
the good projects is lost for society. Under the conditions of Proposition 5.1 this loss
strictly dominates the gain from avoiding lending to bad borrowers. So the net effect is
socially harmful. Screening cycles are strictly dominated by stationary coordinated
screening.
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By way of summarizing, in decentralized markets two sources of inefficiency
may occur. Insufficient information production on worthwhile projects can occur under
decentralized information production under conditions that generate cycles, while quite
generally there is inefficient duplication of information production on unworthy projects.
ii) randomized lending
One might argue that screening cycles may emerge as a consequence of time clustering
and the artificial restriction to exclude randomization strategies. While there may be
good reasons to argue that randomization in lending decisions is unlikely to be
empirically relevant to a large degree, of course, it would be difficult to empirically
prove such a conjecture. Therefore, we explore directly how randomization would affect
our results.
First, of course, as before the monopolist financier would not randomize at all.
The monopolist has incentives to adopt a pure strategy. The market outcome, however,
would change in character. In particular, the screening cycles would disappear with
randomization. Nevertheless, the pool worsening externality will still arise, whenever
competitive screening takes places with positive probability.
Proposition 5.2. (randomization)
When financiers are allowed to randomize with respect to their screening decision, the
region of screening cycles is replaced by completely mixed screening strategies.
Proof: See Appendix.
Randomization only affects the regions with non-stationary strategies of Proposition 3.2.
All other regions remain unmodified. In particular, the pool worsening externality
applies to the randomized equilibrium strategies as well. Accordingly, the welfare result
about excessive screening remains robust with respect to this generalization.
17
VI. Policy Implications
As our welfare analysis has made clear, the nature of the potential market failure
associated with competitive screening decisions is contingent on the combination of
screening costs, classification imperfections and project returns in case of success.
Furthermore, it is not advisable to design policy recommendations, for example
tax/subsidy policies, which are highly sensitive to project-specific information, which the
policy maker is unlikely to observe. Under all circumstances subsidies to improve
financing conditions for innovative firms tend to be contra-productive in our framework.
Essentially, the screening activities per se should not be subsidized, since generally
screening attracts too extensive resources in competitive markets anyway. Furthermore,
project subsidies will act like an improvement in cash flows, and thus increase the
likelihood of screened finance, without altering the fundamental values to society. This
warning is in stark contrast to some recent papers that tend to emphasize positive
externalities in the financing of innovative ventures (e.g. Keuschnigg and Nielsen
(2003)).
The pool-worsening effect of screening is essentially the source of the market
failure whenever the decentralized project evaluation induces inefficiencies, no matter
whether these take the form of delayed information production as in the configuration
with screening cycles or simply excess screening as in the case with the equilibrium
associated with repeated screening for sufficiently high screening costs. With this pool-
worsening effect of uncoordinated screening as the crucial source of the market failure,
the question arises of whether and, in that case, how the required coordination in
screening can be achieved as part of a decentralized mechanism.
On the basis of our analysis information sharing seems an obvious candidate. In
fact, information sharing is a wide-spread institution for consumer credit and commercial
lending. In some countries information sharing is based on private initiative, whereas in
other countries it is delegated to public institutions (see, Japelli and Pagano (2002)).
Interestingly, contrary to the traditional banking industry there is no public information
sharing mechanism in the venture capital industry.
Indeed there may be many reasons why one would not expect that information
sharing will work under all circumstances, and for funding innovative projects in
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particular. Gehrig (2004) has shown how information sharing may adversely affect
incentives to collect high quality information, when the quality of information is a
strategic choice variable. Gehrig and Stenbacka (2007) have theoretically established that
information sharing may in fact magnify oligopoly rents in imperfectly competitive
markets largely at the expense of good (innovative), but financially constrained projects
without an established credit record. In addition, information sharing is a well-known
mechanism to facilitate tacit collusion.8 Consequently, information sharing requires strict
enforcement of competition policy. Otherwise information sharing may imply that truly
good innovative entrepreneurs face higher funding costs. This requirement contrasts with
the view that banking supervisors often implicitly tolerate a certain degree of market
power in order to increase the safety and soundness of the financial industry. We do not
necessarily negate the potential need of such prudential supervisory policies. However,
whenever such prudential policies are applied, the potential total benefits of information
sharing may be offset by associated harmful effects on competition. This holds true
because the potential of information sharing to reduce the pool worsening externality is
then offset by the tendency of information sharing to soften competition among
financiers.
VII. Concluding Comments
Our analysis has highlighted the role of the inter-temporal screening externality induced
by competition as a structural source of instability in financial markets granting
unsecured project funding. While earlier work focusing on banking markets has already
emphasized the potentially harmful consequences of competition with respect to
screening in banking (Broecker (1990)), our article is the first analysis drawing out the
dynamic implications of the screening externality with perfect competition. We
demonstrated how endogenous information acquisition in markets with unsecured
funding and characterized by asymmetric information can create lending cycles as long
as competing financiers undertake their screening decisions in an uncoordinated way. In
the environment of our model such screening cycles emerge in response to competition
8 For an insightful discussion of the antitrust implications of this mechanism we refer to Kühn (2001).
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between financiers, whereas project-specific information exchange between financiers or
cartelization of the funding industry would eliminate such fluctuations.
We explored the welfare implications of decentralized screening competition for
different parameter configurations with respect to the screening costs, screening
imperfections and project returns and we also emphasized the role of imperfections in the
screening technology. We found that excessive screening may emerge as an equilibrium
for a range of intermediate screening costs. Furthermore, for sufficiently low screening
costs we found that the screening activities are typically not socially optimal for a certain
range of project returns.  Even with a stationary pool of new projects we characterized
parameter constellations with screening cycles, i.e. periods of screening are followed by
periods of inactivity and vice versa. Screening cycles are always evidence for screening
inefficiencies.
Screening cycles may also interact with other sources generating industry and
business cycle dynamics. For example, some significant recent studies have developed
models of financial accelerator effects, which emphasize mechanisms whereby adverse
shocks to the economy are endogenously amplified and propagated by credit market
imperfections. These models were surveyed within a dynamic general equilibrium
framework by, for example, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000). On an intuitive level
already Fisher (1933) discussed how credit constraints propagate the effects of shocks on
aggregate output and asset prices. According to Fisher, the more the private sector places
emphasis on solving its debt problem the deeper the economy will be caught in a debt
trap. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) provided an influential model of a dynamic economy
where borrowers' credit limits are affected by the prices of the collateralized assets. Their
analysis showed how the dynamic interaction between credit limits and asset prices will
constitute an important transmission mechanism whereby shocks to the economy persist,
amplify and spill over across different sectors. In contrast to these theories focusing on
how asset price fluctuations are amplified and propagated by credit market imperfections
our theory does not require the existence of exogenous stochastic shocks.
In line with our model, Suarez and Sussman (1997) have developed a theory for
how credit cycles may emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon in an otherwise stationary
equilibrium. However, Suarez and Sussman presented a mechanism centered around
moral hazard, not adverse selection. More precisely, during booms expanded production
leads to lower prices, which increase the need for external finance. But, a higher debt
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burden leads to excessive risk taking and an associated high rate of business failures, i.e.
a bust. During a bust, production is contracted and prices increase, which improves the
liquidity reserves of firms. This in turn mitigates the moral hazard problems, leading to
lower risk taking and the economy heads towards a boom again.
Whenever they occur, screening cycles are manifestations of a market failure.
This type of market failure derives from limitations of communication in decentralized
markets. Hence, in our theory it seems that information exchange could prevent cycles.
On the other hand, information exchange may also soften competition and facilitate
collusion. Likewise, cycles will not emerge in cartelised or even monopolistic financial
markets. This leaves an interesting design problem for future research of how to stabilize
the screening activities without sacrificing other benefits of decentralized competition.
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Appendix:
Proof of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2:
We find it convenient to prove the two propositions together. The split into two separate
statements in the main text has been chosen for presentation purposes only.
Given the nature of projects financiers are confronted with a pool of projects that
consist of two vintages at most.
Moreover there are three states in each period. The market can rest in inactivity
(N), it can be in screening regime (S), and it can finance without screening (A). The state
in period t-1 determines the pool size and composition in period t. So after a period of
inactivity, the project pool has size 2 and a quality lg =N . After a period of screening
in t-1, the pool consists of the new projects and bad projects that we denied finance
previously, and hence bid for a second chance (by assumption good projects are always
correctly classified and therefore leave the pool in a screening regime). In this case the
pool quality is ( )( )bl
l
g
--+
=
111S
. After a period of unconditional financing (A), the
pool of applicants only consists of new projects with quality lg =A .
 Depending on the state of the market in period t competitive prices can be
determined by a zero profit condition. So after a period of inactivity (N) the market will
rest in (N). This will occur, whenever neither screened financing nor unconditional
financing in t can break even. Screening in t is feasible if the competitive rate NSR  does
not exceed GR . The competitive rate is determined by the zero-profit condition
( )( ) 01 =--+- cRNS blllp (A.1)
Likewise unscreened finance requires that the competitive lending rate after this history
satisfies GNA RR £ , where
01 =-NARlp . (A.2)
After a state of screening the pool is adversely affected. Hence the zero profit condition
for competitive screening is
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( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) 0111111 =--+---+-+- cRSS blbblblllp  , or equivalently:
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
lp
bl
lp
bbll cRSS
--+
+
--+
=
11121 (A.3)
and for unconditional finance ( )( )( ) 0111 =--+- bllp SAR ,   or equivalently
( )( )
lp
bl --+
=
111
SAR (A.4)
Viability of screening or unconditional financing implies that GSS RR £  and GSA RR £ ,
respectively.
Finally, after a state of unscreened finance (A) screening in period t is viable if
( )
GNSAS R
cRR £+-+==
lplp
bll 1 (A.5)
and unscreened finance is viable if
GNAAA RRR £== lp
1 . (A.6)
We can now offer a complete characterization of competitive equilibrium by analyzing
the 9 potential two-period combinations of the three states.
First we note that screening dominates unconditional finance when screening
costs are sufficiently low.  (A.5) and (A.6) imply that after the states (A) or (N) screening
dominates unconditional finance if
( )( )bl --< 11c (A.7)
and (A.3) and (A.4) imply that after state (S) screening dominates if
( )( ) ( )( )bl
b
bl
--+
-
--<
111
211c  . (A.8)
Second we note that screening (S) dominates inactivity (N) after a period of
screening, when GSS RR £ , which according to (A.3) implies
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )cRG blbblllp --++--+³ 11121
1   . (A.9)
Otherwise inactivity obtains after a period of screening.
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Screening dominates inactivity after a period of inactivity (N) or unconditional finance
(A) if GASNS RRR £= , which implies
( )( )( )cRG +-+³ blllp 1
1    . (A.10)
Otherwise inactivity results.
Finally unconditional finance obtains after a period of unconditional finance (A)
or inactivity (N), whenever the unscreened pool is profitable, i.e.
lp
1
³GR  : (A.11)
With these observations we can characterize directly the stationary equilibria.
i) Unconditional financing (AA) will occur when (A.11) and the reverse of (A.7)
are satisfied.
ii) Stationary screening (SS) will occur when (A.8) and (A.9) are satisfied
iii) Stationary inactivity (NN) will occur for
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )
ïþ
ï
ý
ü
ïî
ï
í
ì
--++--++-+< ccRG blbblllp
bll
lplp
111211,11,1min
Since ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )cc blbbll
lp
bll
lp
--++--+<+-+ 11121111  there
is a region for small enough screening costs, i.e. ( )( )bl --£ 11c  that neither exhibits
stationary screening nor inactivity. This region has the property that GSS RR >  but at the
same time GNS RR <  and NANS RR < . Hence this region specifies cyclical equilibria
with a two-cycle alternating between screening and inactivity.
This completes the characterization of market equilibria.
Q.E.D
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Proof of Proposition 4.1:
Due to the assumption of perfect recall monopolist never faces the screening externality.
Hence stationarity of the pool of new projects implies stationarity of his optimization
problem. His expected revenues of unscreened lending are given by 1-= G
A RR lp ,
while the revenues of screened lending and inactivity are ( )( ) cRR GS --+-= blllp 1
and 0=NR  respectively.
Unscreened lending (A) is viable only if
lp
1
³GR . Screened lending (S) is
viable only if ( )
lp
bll cRG
+-+
³
1 .  Note that the latter condition specifies a linear
function ( )cRG  in c.
On the other hand screened financing (S) dominates unscreened financing (A)
when the cost of screening exceed the gains from screening, i.e. when ( )( ) c£-- bl 11 .
It turns out that screened financing is always viable at the critical level of screening costs
( )( )bl --= 11c  is ( )
lp
1
=cRG .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.2:
The probability that a bad project is misclassified as a creditworthy one is b .  Therefore,
by Bayes’ rule, the probability that a project is truly creditworthy condition on having
passed the credit test is
bll
lt
)1( -+
=     .
Now assume that the competitive financiers randomize with respect to their screening
decision. More precisely, let a  denote the probability that a project is screened. Then the
competitive lending rate, )(aR , is determined by the condition
27
[ ] ( ) [ ] 01)(1)1()( =--++- aplaapta RcR   ,
from which we can conclude that
[ ]laatp
a
a
)1(
1)(
-+
+
=
cR    .
It should be observed that the boundaries, i.e. the pure strategy decisions, satisfy
lp
1)0( =R
as well as
[ ]bll
lp
)1(1)1( -++= cR .
Because ( )( )bl --£ 11c  (by Proposition 3.2 (ii)) and 1)1( <-+ bll  it is then
straightforward to verify that
)1()0( RRR NS >> .
This means that the allocations associated with the screening cycles in Proposition 3.2
(ii) can always be implemented as a mixed strategy equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
